The aim of the current study was to examine cognitive and psychological factors hypothesized to affect responding to intrusions in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). A group of individuals diagnosed with OCD was compared to a social phobia (SP) group and a nonclinical control group. Participants performed neuropsychological tasks, completed selfreport measures, and engaged in a self-relevant thought suppression task. The OCD group demonstrated worse working memory and response inhibition and had increased intrusions during the suppression task relative to comparison groups. They also reported more distress during the task relative to the nonclinical group, but not the SP group. Regression analyses revealed that beliefs about thought control failures, but not working memory or response inhibition, was associated with increased frequency of intrusions and greater distress during suppression. Findings support cognitive-behavioural models of OCD that emphasize the role of meta-beliefs in explaining the struggle with obsessional thoughts.
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Thus, in the current study, we attempted to integrate two prominent lines of OCD theory and research by examining how both neuropsychological indices and specific beliefs about controlling intrusions predict responding to intrusions in a clinical OCD sample. We administered tests of several aspects of cognition proposed to influence thought suppression:
working memory (OSPAN), response inhibition (Hayling), and set-shifting (Trail Making Test) . We also included the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI), an abbreviated gold standard measure of intellectual functioning to control for overall intelligence. In order to clarify whether any deficits in these domains are specific to OCD or represent a shared feature of anxiety in general, we compared OCD participants to both a healthy nonclinical group and an anxious comparison group (primary social phobia diagnosis). Furthermore, we assessed for general psychopathology in order to rule out the potential confounding influence of anxiety and depression on cognitive functioning.
In addition to examining the cognitive strategies individuals use in their daily life, we employed a modified thought suppression paradigm with a naturalistic intrusive thought (Rassin, 2001) to investigate the influence of these neurocognitive functions on in vivo control efforts. We induced a self-relevant negative thought (imagining a loved one in a car accident) and instructed all participants to suppress the thought. Previous studies have employed a thought suppression paradigm with individuals with OCD (Janeck & Calamari, 1999; Tolin et al., 2002) . A novel aspect of the current study, however, was the focus on identifying specific indices of cognitive dysfunction and OCD-related beliefs that predicted response to the thought suppression task.
In sum, the aim of the current study was to examine neuropsychological and cognitive-behavioural explanations for recurrent obsessional thoughts in OCD. In order to accomplish this aim, we determined whether cognitive impairments, such as decreased response inhibition, set-shifting, and working memory, had an impact on chronic and in vivo responding to intrusions among individuals with OCD. We extended previous research on this question by including an anxiety disorder comparison group with equivalent depression and anxiety symptoms to evaluate the specificity of cognitive deficits. In addition, we investigated the contribution of beliefs about controlling unwanted thoughts to thought suppression difficulties. Our predictions were as follows:
1. The OCD group would demonstrate poorer performance on tests of working memory, response inhibition, and set-shifting than both comparison groups, despite comparable intelligence overall.
2. The OCD group would report increased chronic thought suppression and greater beliefs about the need to control thoughts relative to both comparison groups.
3. The OCD group would experience increased frequency of intrusions (thought suppression failures) and increased distress during a self-relevant thought suppression task relative to both comparison groups.
4. Worse performance on cognitive tasks and secondary appraisals about the need to control thoughts would predict increased frequency of intrusions and increased distress during thought suppression.
Materials and Method

Participants
Nonclinical Control Group. Twenty females and 4 males with a mean age of 33.95 (SD = 9.56) who did not endorse any current or lifetime mood, anxiety, substance-abuse, head injury, or psychotic disorder were included in this group.
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Group. Thirteen females and 9 males with a mean age of 29.13 (SD = 10.04), all meeting DSM-IV criteria for OCD were included in this group.
Current diagnostic information obtained from the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, Di Nardo, & Barlow, 1994 ) is presented in Table 1 . Social Phobia Group. Seventeen females and 8 males with a mean age of 29.44 (SD = 13.77), all meeting DSM-IV criteria for social phobia (SP) were included in this group. Current and lifetime diagnostic information for this group is also presented in Table 1 .
Insert Table 1 
Questionnaires
Concern About Failures in Thought Control Questionnaire (CFTCQ; Purdon, 2001).
The CFTCQ is self-report measure of appraisals of intrusive thoughts with two subscales; the 6-item Control scale that provides an index of the perception that thoughts and mental capacities are out of control and the 8-item Fusion/Dystonicity scale that provides a measure of the implications of the thought for the individual's personality, mental state, and likelihood of the thought coming true. The CFTCQ demonstrates good psychometric properties (Purdon, 2001 ). In the current sample Cronbach's alpha was .87and .67 for the Control and Fusion/Dystonicity subscales, respectively. A total score was calculated by summing the two subscales.
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) . The DASS is a 21-item self-report measure which requires participants to rate on a scale from 0 (does not apply to me at all) to 4 (applies to me very much) the extent to which each item applies to them. The items on the DASS tap into depression, anxiety and stress, with subscale scores ranging from 0 to 42. Depression scores 13 and lower, anxiety scores 9 and lower, and stress scores 18 and lower indicate symptoms in the mild to normal range (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) . This measure demonstrates good reliability and internal consistency (Henry & Crawford, 2005 ). Cronbach's alpha was .95 in the current sample. 
Neuropsychological Tests
Wechsler Abbreviated The Operation-Span Task (OSPAN; Turner & Engle, 1989) . The OSPAN task is a measure of working memory ability that requires participants to solve a series of math operations while trying to remember a set of unrelated words. Materials were adapted to be displayed via computer and presented using Powerpoint. Exposure and recording was controlled by the experimenter. An 85% accuracy criterion on the math operations was required for all the participants. The final score reflects the total number of correctly recalled words in the correct position. The OSPAN has been shown to have good reliability and validity (Engle et al., 1999) Hayling Sentence Completion Test (Hayling; Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The Hayling consists of two sets of 15 sentences, each having the last word missing. In set 1 respondents verbally complete the sentence as quickly as possible, providing an index of response initiation. In set 2 respondents are required to complete the sentence as quickly as possible with an unrelated word, providing an index of response inhibition. An overall scaled score taking into account response latencies and commission errors is calculated ranging from 1 (impaired) to 10 (very superior).
Procedure
Ethical approval was obtained by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of New South Wales. Participants were recruited via separate advertisements placed in the community either targeting individuals with no current or lifetime history of mental health concerns to participate in a study of how thoughts influence behaviour, or through advertisements placed on mental health websites seeking individuals with symptoms consistent with OCD or SP. All participants were initially screened over telephone by a PhD level psychologist (AW) using the screening module of the SCID-I/NP. Current substance abuse, history of head injury, and psychotic disorder were exclusion criteria for all participants. Eligible respondents were then invited to attend an individual research session.
After obtaining informed consent, participants completed an electronic battery of the selfreport questionnaires and the experimental protocol delivered via Medialab software.
The experimental protocol was based on the Sentence Completion Task (Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant, & Teachman, 1996) used as a TAF induction. Participants were first instructed to type the name of an important person who is currently in the participant's life in the space provided. The subsequent screen embedded the loved-one's name in the following sentence 'Now imagine that (loved-one's name) has been in a car accident'. This information was presented on the computer screen for 30 s and then participants were informed that this would be their 'target thought'. Participants then completed the baseline Target Thought ratings. Participants were then presented with a cognitive load (a 6-digit number) and informed they would be asked to recall this number throughout the experiment. All participants engaged in an initial 2 min baseline monitoring period followed by a 2 min suppression phase and a final 2 min monitoring phase as outlined below.
Baseline and monitor phase instructions:
During the few minutes, you may think about anything you like. You may think about the accident target thought, but you do not have to. If at any time you think of the accident target thought please press the X key for each occurrence. It is important that you continue in the same way for the full duration.
Suppression phase instruction:
During the next few minutes, please record your thoughts as you did before. It is very important that you try as hard as you can to suppress the accident target thought, but be sure to press the X key if you do think of the accident target thought. It is important that you continue in the same way for the full duration.
Following each 2-min period participants were asked to enter the six-digit number and to complete the Target Thought ratings. Participants were then provided with the option of taking a 10-minute break before completing the battery of neuropsychological tasks (Trails, WASI, Hayling, OSPAN). Lastly, the ADIS-IV was administered. A small financial reimbursement was provided in exchange for participants' time.
Results
Preliminary data analyses
Outliers were identified and removed prior to conducting statistical procedures.
Outliers were defined as cases with standardised scores in excess of 3.29 (p<.001, two-tailed test), as recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) .
Group characteristics
The three groups were tested together using ANOVA. Follow-up tests were conducted using Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) post hoc testing. 
Questionnaires
With respect to self-report questionnaires, ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of groups on the symptom measures (DASS subscales), as well as measures of tendency to suppress thoughts (WBSI) and beliefs about failures of thought control (CFTCQ) (see Table   3 ). Post hoc tests indicated that the OCD and SP groups did not differ with respect to either depression, anxiety, or stress symptoms, beliefs about thought control failures, or the tendency to thought-suppress. Both clinical groups, however, scored significantly higher than the nonclinical comparison group on each of these measures of symptoms and thought suppression.
Neuropsychological tests
One-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted in order to evaluate differences in cognitive functioning between the three groups (see Table 4 ). There were no t = 1.51, p = .14) did not contribute uniquely to the prediction of distress during suppression.
Discussion
The current study extended previous research on thought control difficulties in OCD by evaluating both cognitive functioning (working memory, response inhibition, and setshifting) and beliefs about needing to control thoughts, two key factors implicated in the pathogenesis of OCD. Results regarding cognitive performance were partially consistent with predictions. Despite comparable general intelligence, the OCD group had poorer working memory and response inhibition (but not set-shifting) than both comparison groups, as well as more frequent intrusions during the suppression task. It is possible that these differences in cognitive performance reflected anxiety and lack of confidence during the task rather than a true deficit integral to OCD. It was therefore critical that we included a SP group characterized not only by high levels of anxiety, but by fears of negative evaluation in particular. Given the OSPAN task required participants to perform the task aloud with the experimenter tracking accuracy, if task performance was attributable solely to anxiety we would have expected the greatest deficit to be observed in the social phobia group. However, the SP group did not exhibit impaired response inhibition nor impaired working memory.
With respect to the self-report measures, the OCD group reported more chronic, daily difficulties with intrusive thoughts on the WBSI and more beliefs about the need to control thoughts on the CFTCQ than the nonclinical control group, but did not differ on either of these measures from the SP group. The lack of difference between the clinical groups on these constructs supports proposals that thought suppression is a transdiagnostic process that is not unique to OCD ( Future studies may compare and contrast the use of thought suppression strategies across Axis I diagnoses.
In addition to cognitive tasks and self-report measures, the current study included an in vivo suppression task to evaluate the contribution of working memory and control metacognitions to thought suppression failures and distress. The OCD group experienced more intrusions than both comparison groups and both clinical groups both reported more distress than nonclinical comparison participants. Contrary to prediction, performance the OSPAN and the Hayling did not predict responding to the suppression task, although beliefs about the need to control thoughts uniquely predicted both frequency of intrusions and distress during thought suppression. These findings support the models of Clark and Purdon (Clark, 2004; Purdon, 1999) , which suggest a central role for metacognitive beliefs about thought control and the meaning of failures in thought control. According to these models, metabeliefs such as "I can and should be able to control all my thoughts" and "Mental control is an important part of self-control" motivate suppression and other control efforts. In the current study, these metacognitive beliefs predicted response to thought suppression beyond neuropsychological factors and general negative affect, providing support for the critical role of secondary appraisals in the struggle with intrusive thoughts.
In contrast, current findings did not provide support for the disinhibition model of OCD (Chamberlain et al., 2005; Olley, Malhi, & Sachdev, 2007) . Although OCD patients demonstrated poorer working memory and response inhibition than the comparison groups, working memory did not predict response to the in vivo thought suppression task. Moritz and colleagues noted that the disinhibition model is unable to account for important aspects of OCD, including the universality of intrusive thoughts and findings that OCD patients do not have difficulty inhibiting random stimuli, but struggle with specific thoughts related to sensitive themes such as sexuality, aggression, and morality (Moritz, Rietschel, Jelinek, & Bäuml, 2011 ). An interesting possibility is that OCD symptoms experienced during the neurocognitive tasks may have accounted for the OCD group's poorer performance on the neuropsychological tests rather than neuropsychological vulnerability leading to OCD symptoms (Moritz, Hottenrott, Jelinek, Brooks, & Scheurich, 2011).
The current study was limited by a restricted selection of neuropsychological tests.
Given the many possible aspects of cognitive functioning, it is possible that additional measures would have tapped other aspects of inhibition that influenced responding to intrusions during the suppression task. Another limitation of the current study was the modest sample size. Future studies may include a more comprehensive battery of cognitive tests and a larger sample size. Nonetheless, the current study has several important strengths, including the use of a self-relevant in vivo task as well as a measure of chronic thought suppression, the inclusion of both nonclinical and anxiety disordered (SP) comparison groups, and the inclusion of several measures of key aspects of neuropsychological functioning, including a reliable and valid test of working memory. 
